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Nova Scotia enacted human rights legislation in 1963,2 but it was
not until 1972 that the Act was amended to include sex as one of the
prohibited grounds of discrimination. 3 Since 1957 women in Nova
Scotia had had equal pay protection, 4 but this brought about no
noticeable improvement in the status of women in the labour force.
Some commentators have suggested that equal pay laws in fact
worsened that status by giving employers economic incentives to
maintain and consolidate low-paying all-female job ghettoes to
avoid the effects of the legislation. 5 Equal pay legislation could
have no application to women who were denied access to jobs and
promotions, stratified in "women's" jobs and discriminated against
in "conditions of employment" other than pay. It was in response
to public pressure for comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation
for women8 to back up equal pay provisions that the 1972
amendments were passed.
The Nova Scotia legislature did not simply add "sex" to the list
of prohibited grounds of discrimination throughout the Act. Instead,
a separate provision was enacted to deal comprehensively with sex
discrimination. The section, as it relates to employment, reads:
1 A. (1) No person shall deny to, or discriminate against, an
individual or class of individuals, because of the sex of the
*Elizabeth Shilton Lennon, 2d Year Law Student, Dalhousie University.
1. Human Rights Act, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11, as am. by S.N.S. 1972, c.65, s.2.
2. Human Rights Act, S.N.S. 1963, c.5.
3. S.N.S. 1972, c.65, s.2.
4. Equal Pay Act, S.N.S. 1956, c.5, in force January 1, 1957.
5. E.g. "Women and Work in Canada: a Study of Legislation" in Women's
Bureau, '74 (Ottawa: Labour Canada, Women's Bureau, 1975) 17 at 27.
6. Women are, of course, the worst victims of sex discrimination, but the
legislation is framed in general terms and has the wholly desirable side-effect of
giving men access to "women's" jobs and the "protective" employment benefits
formerly granted only to women.
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individual or class of individuals, in providing or refusing to
provide any of the following:
(d) employment, conditions of employment or continuing
employment, or the use of application forms or advertising for
employment, unless there is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion based on sex.
Subsection (2) of s. L1A deals also with employment rights in that it
prohibits employment agencies, employees' associations, profes-
sional, business and trade associations, and agencies performing
public functions through the use of volunteers from discriminating
on the basis of sex. I propose to confine my discussion to the
application of s. 1A(l) (d) as it relates to "employment, conditions
of employment or continuing employment", and to the procedures
provided by the Act for implementing its substantive provisions.
If the legislature had intended that people discriminated against
on the basis of sex should be given the same protection as those
discriminated against on other prohibited bases, the logical course
of action would have been simply to incorporate "sex" into the
other provisions of the Act; this was the course followed in most
other jurisdictions. The fact that this was not done suggests that
differences in degree and kind of protection may have been
intended, and there are troublesome differences in wording between
s.11A and s.8, the general employment section, that may well be
interpreted to the disadvantage of people complaining under s. 1 IA.
This section is very loosely drafted and not easy to construe, but it
seems clear enough, for example, that no one can violate s. 1 A who
is not in a position to "provid[e] or refus[e] to provide ...
employment etc. ." This is a considerably narrower class of
persons than that contemplated by s.8(1), which prohibits any
person from, among other things, discriminating "against an
individual in regard to employment or any term or condition of
employment" (emphasis added).
H. Roberta Ryan's Case
To date there has been only one decision of a Nova Scotia board of
inquiry interpreting s. llA as it relates to employment: Ryan v.
Town of North Sydney. 7 The complainant in that case, Roberta
Ryan, alleged that she had been refused a job with the North Sydney
Police Force because of her sex. She was a trained police officer and
7. (Nova Scotia Board of Inquiry, 1975). These decisions are unreported.
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had done summer work with the North Sydney Force while at the
Atlantic Police Academy. When she applied for a permanent
position she was rejected.
The process of getting a job with the town is quite complicated.
The prospective police officer submits an application to the Chief of
Police, who assesses these applications and makes recommenda-
tions to Council as to who should be hired. Council then votes on
the recommendations. In Ms. Ryan's case, the Chief did not
recommend to Council that she be hired. Council members were
somewhat puzzled as to why her name was not placed before them:
she was a trained police officer, a resident of North Sydney and had
performed well over the summer. When challenged as to why he did
not recommend her, the Chief gave this answer as recorded in the
minutes of the meeting:
Ron Parsons, Chief of Police, explained that we have a Union
and he wouldn't feel like putting her on back shift [midnight to
8:00 a.m.] where she would have to work patrol and for that
reason he didn't consider her but if she would could [sic] be put
on days he would certainly have recommended her. He feels that
with the Union we will run into problems because some of the
men have been on night shift for years and if there is a day shift
available they will want it. 8
The people who were hired would have to be able to work the back
shift; no problem, apparently, for any of the male applicants, but
impossible, in his view, for Ms. Ryan.
Council was generally unhappy with the Chief's recommenda-
tions. He had, contrary to the usual practice, recommended
someone from out of town. Furthermore, there was some
uncertainty about how many police officers the town really needed
to hire. After a great deal of confusion it was decided to postpone
the decision until the next meeting of Council. At the next meeting
two male applicants were hired, both of whom had been
recommended by the Chief at the previous meeting. One of these
men had no police training. Roberta Ryan did not get the job.
She took her complaint to the Nova Scotia Human Rights
Commission. The Human Rights Act contemplates a three-stage
process after the lodging of a complaint (a process I will be dealing
with in much greater detail later): (1) investigation (s.23) (2),
attempt at settlement (s.23), and (3) public hearing before a board of
inquiry (s.25(1)). The Commission investigated her complaint but
8. Id. at 5-6.
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was unable to effect a settlement. Finally, almost twenty months
after the employment decision had been made, her case came before
a one-man board of inquiry, Mr. Keith Eaton.
At the board of inquiry the height/weight qualifications for the
North Sydney Police Force were raised as a defence. These
qualifications were contained in the Police Regulations and printed
in the advertisements for police positions. They required prospec-
tive police officers to be 5'8" tall and weigh 160 pounds. It is clear
that Roberta Ryan, at 5'61/2" and 125 pounds, did not meet them.
But it is equally clear from the evidence given at the inquiry that,
whatever their legal status, these regulations were viewed in the
rather casual municipal hiring process as mere guidelines that would
not stand in the way of hiring an applicant otherwise acceptable. 9
Mr. Eaton was somewhat disturbed by the fact that the reason
given before the board for refusal to recommend Ms. Ryan differed
from the reason recorded in the minutes of the Council meeting. In
his decision he analyses these two reasons as
(1) difficulty in administering shift work consistent with union
seniority requirements: '0 and
(2) failure to meet the requirements of the Police Regulations'
qualifications, particularly those relating to minimum height and
weight. 11
But having satisfied himself that these two reasons are not
"inconsistent", he appears to conclude that Chief Parsons did not
discriminate because both reasons were operative at the time the
recommendations were made. There is no evidence at all from the
decision that he even recognizes reason #1 for what it is: an
assumption, based on the kind of sexual stereotyping prohibited by
the Act, that a woman either could not or would not want to work
night shift.
9. See Transcript of Evidence and Proceedings, cross-examination of Martin F.
Collins, 269-74; testimony of Ron Parsons, 365-6.
10. If this was the embryo of an argument that the Police Chief was not responsible
for his actions because they were dictated by a union agreement, the argument
would not have succeeded. Quite apart from the fact that a contract to violate the
Human Rights Act would be void for illegality, s.24(7) of the Trade Union Act,
S.N.S. 1972, c.19, provides that a trade union that "discriminates against any
person because of sex..." shall not be certified "nor shall an agreement entered
into between that trade union and that employer be deemed to be a collective
agreement."
11. Ryan, supra, note 7 at 13.
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Mr. Eaton ultimately gives three reasons for finding the
complaint unsupported by the evidence: (1) the Chiefs failure to
recommend was not discriminatory (presumably for the reasons
given above); (2) even if it was, mere recommendations are not
covered by the Act; and (3) there was no employment decision made
by Council at the meeting specified in the complaint (the first
meeting) and therefore no violation of the Act. 12 Furthermore, he
concludes that there was "no evidence" 13 to show that the actual
decision made at the second meeting involved any discrimination
against Roberta Ryan.
Roberta Ryan had a strong case. A municipal employee,
authorized and instructed to recommend job applicants, had refused
to recommend her. The reason he gave for his action was that a
woman could not work the same shifts as a man could, a reason
prohibited by the Act. Council made a decision consistent with that
recommendation. These facts were found insufficient to bring the
case within the purview of the Human Rights Act.
This decision sets an unfortunately timid and conservative
precedent for sex discrimination cases in Nova Scotia. Some of the
fault lies with the legislation: while it is not an inevitable conclusion
that s. 1 A does not cover mere recommendations, it is certainly a
possible one. But much of the fault lies with the board of inquiry
which failed utterly to grasp the nettle and confront the very
complex legal and social issues raised by a charge of sex
discrimination in employment. One purpose of this paper is to
isolate some of those issues and suggest ways of dealing with them
effectively within the framework of human rights legislation.
III. What the Act Prohibits
Section 1 A lays down some fairly clear-cut prohibitions. First of
all, it is unlawful to refuse or deny someone a job, including a
promotion, because of sex. Secondly, it is unlawful to refuse to
provide "continuing employment" because of sex. This provision
clearly includes firing, but is also broad enough to encompass
situations involving lay-off and recall. Thirdly, the Act prohibits
12. Id. at 18. This third reason seems a very technical peg on which to hang a
decision like this. The complaint had already been amended once to change the date
after the board's appointment (See Transcript, supra, note 9 at 115) and this could
easily have been done again.
13. Ryan, supra, note 7 at 18.
598 The Dalhousie Law Journal
discrimination in "conditions of employment". It is not easy to
define precisely what aspects of the employment relationship are
covered by this phrase. The French conditions de travail, translated
by the Supreme Court of Canada as "conditions of employment' ',14
was interpreted in Syndicat Catholique des Employ~s de Magasins
de Quebec v. La Compagnie Paquet15 as comprehending the whole
range of terms possible in an employment contract; where a trade
union negotiates a collective agreement covering conditions de
travail, said the court, "there is no room left for private
negotiations between employer and employee." 1
6
The scope of the phrase "conditions of employment" is, then,
very broad indeed. It would cover remuneration in all forms,
including wages, salaries, pensions and insurance plans. It would
include seniority systems, access to training programmes, rest
breaks, and leave-of-absence policies. It would include all aspects
of the physical environment, such as on-site accommodation, rest
and recreational facilities.
One aspect of the employment relationship that Human Rights
Commissions in at least two provinces 17 believe to be outside the
scope of "conditions of employment" and therefore outside their
jurisdiction is the matter of dress on the job. They characterize dress
as falling within the "discretionary power of employers". This is
almost certainly an erroneous conclusion. If the employment
relationship is a contractual one there can be no area of
"discretionary power" for either party that cannot be encroached
upon in the bargaining process. Dress is surely something that could
be negotiated, even if most employees do not, and if so, it is a
'condition of employment".
The phrase in s.8 comparable to s.11A's "conditions of
employment" is "terms and conditions of employment". It is this
latter phrase or its variant "terms or conditions of employment",
that is invariably used in Nova Scotia labour legislation to designate
the whole range of negotiable items in the employment
relationship. 18 Applying the established principle that
14. Syndicat Catholique des Employis de Magasin de Quebec v. La Compagnie
Paquet, [1959] S.C.R. 206 at 211; 18 D.L.R. (2d) 346 at 352.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 212; 18 D.L.R. at 353.
17. See Ottawa Journal, March 30, 1974 (Ontario); Winnipeg Free Press, October
10, 1974 (Manitoba).
18. E.g. Trade Union Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, s.l.(e).
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. . . from the general presumption that the same expression is
presumed to be used in the same sense throughout an Act or a
series of cognate Acts, there follows the further presumption that
a change in wording denotes a change in meaning19
,it is at least arguable that by excluding the word "terms" the
legislature intended to circumscribe the scope of s.l1 A. An item
they may reasonably have intended to exclude is equal pay, since
this is generally covered by the Labour Standards Code, 20 a statute
passed in the same session of the legislature in which the sex
discrimination amendment was passed.
If that was the legislative intent, it is doubtful, in view of the
Paquet case, 2 ' that it was achieved. It would be unfortunate if the
argument that equal pay is not a "condition of employment" should
succeed, since the Human Rights Commission is presently the only
recourse professionals and domestic servants, two classes of
employees excluded from the protection of the Labour Standards
Code,22 have for equal pay complaints. The Human Rights
Commission has certainly conciliated complaints on the basis that it
has jurisdiction over discrimination in wage levels.
Whether the complaint involves hiring, firing or "conditions of
employment" there must first be denial or discrimination "in
providing or refusing to provide" before there is a breach of the
Act. A question that may arise preliminary to establishing the
jurisdiction of the Commission over the case is: what constitutes a
refusal or denial? Need the employer give an outright refusal before
the Commission can inquire into his employment practices? In
Ontario this question was answered in Segrave v. Zellers2 3 , where it
was held that in light of the "realities of the relationship that exists
between an interviewer and a person seeking employment",24 an
applicant for a job or promotion need only pursue the job as far as it
is reasonable to do so before invoking the remedies of the Act. In
that case the prospective employee was told by an interviewer that
the company did not hire men for the position in question. The
company argued at the inquiry that its interviewer might have
19. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, ed. P. St. J. Langan (12th. ed.
London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1969).
20. S.N.S. 1972, c.10.
21. Supra, note 14.
22. Supra, note 20. See Reg. 2(1), (2).
23. (Ontario Board of Inquiry, 1975).
24. Id. at 3-4.
600 The Dalhousie Law Journal
changed her mind if the applicant had pursued the matter. The board
found that this went beyond the degree of persistence that could be
reasonably expected of a job applicant: "the words spoken to Mr.
Segrave . . . would lead any reasonable man to infer that it was
pointless for him to pursue the matter any further".25 This principle
may be important to applicants for jobs in large companies with
frequently recurring job vacancies: in those situations the employer
could stall indefinitely without making a decision on a particular
application. In cases where there is just one job in question, hiring
someone other than the person complaining would be sufficient
"denial" to invoke the jurisdiction of the Commission.
IV. What the Act Does Not Prohibit
There are, of course, an infinite number of possible defences to a
charge of sex discrimination. Three have become fairly standard
and are developing a body of law around them defining their scope.
These are (1) the statutory defence of "bona fide occupational
qualification based on sex" (BFOQ); (2) the defence of "no
discrimination" based on the application of sex-neutral job
qualifications or rules, and (3) the defence of conflicting legislation.
1. BFOQ Based on Sex
Section I lA(l) (d) of the Human Rights Act spells out that
employers are not prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex
in relation to jobs that require a "bona fide occupational
qualification based on sex". Clearly, then, the legislature has
determined that while there is never (except when the employer is
an "exclusively religious or ethnic organization" (s.8(4) (b)), a
rational basis for discriminating on the grounds of "race, religion,
creed, colour or ethnic or national origin", there may be such a
rational, or at least defensible, basis for discriminating on grounds
of sex.
Before dealing with specific situations in which the defence
might be available it is necessary to examine the legal nature of the
test the employer who raises the defence would have to meet. It is
clear that once sex discrimination is established as the basis of the
employment decision, the onus shifts to the employer to prove that
his case falls within the BFOQ exception. 26 What is not so clear is
25. Id. at 4.
26. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company (1969), 408
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whether he must meet an objective or subjective test. The
expression "bonafide" usually signals a subjective test, and a New
Brunswick board of inquiry decision suggests that a qualification of
sex, established in "good faith", might satisfy the requirements of
their similarily-worded Act. 27 In this regard a discrepancy in
wording between s.8 and s.l lA should once again be noted: s.8
provides a defence for "exclusively religious or ethnic organiza-
tions" where there is a "reasonable occupational qualification"
(emphasis added), clearly an objective test. A number of other
jurisdictions require that the occupational qualification be "reason-
able" rather than "bonafide". 
28
If the test is a subjective one then it is possible that employment
practices based on traditional views about the roles and capacities of
women may not violate the Act as long as they are held honestly and
in good faith. Surely this is not what the legislature intended! Of
course, with the increasingly active role being played by women in
all areas of the labour force, the good faith with which traditional
views are held must become increasingly questionable. In any case,
whether the test is objective or subjective, the employer would have
to argue that he believed a woman could not do the job, not just that
he did not want her to do it, before he could hope to succeed with
the defence.
The legislature gives no guidelines as to the types of jobs for
which a BFOQ based on sex can be said to exist. The agencies
administering sex discrimination legislation are all agreed that the
exception must be interpreted narrowly to prevent it from
completely subverting the Act. 
29
F.2d. 228 at 232 (U.S.C.A. 5th Circ.), adopted in Shack v. London Driv-Ur-Self
(Ontario Board of Inquiry, 1974) at 19.
27.MacBean v. Village of Plaster Rock (New Brunswick Board of Inquiry, 1975)
at 12.
28. E.g. The Human Rights Act, S.M. 1974, c.H-175, s.6(6). British Columbia
hedges, but applies its "exception" not just to sex: "Every person has the right of
equality of opportunity based upon bona fide qualifications . . . unless reasonable
cause exists ....... (Human Rights Code of British Columbia, S.B.C. 1973,
c. 119, s.8(l)). The American legislation is similarly equivocal: an employer has a
defence where sex is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." (Civil Rights Act,
1964, Title VII, 78 Stat. 241, s.703 (e)).
29. Conversation with K. Jega Nathan, Chief Investigative Officer of the Nova
Scotia Human Rights Commission. See also Revised Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, reprinted
in T.H. Oehmke, Sex Discrimination in Employment (Detroit: Trends Publishing,
1974) at 101-6. Guideline 1604.2.
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The American Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
(EEOC), the agency administering American anti-discrimination
legislation similar to the Human Rights Act, has issued some fairly
stringent guidelines30 as to what will not be considered to establish a
BFOQ, although it is understandably reluctant to give concrete
examples of what will. The defence will be unacceptable in cases of
(1) the refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on
assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of
women in general. For example, the assumption that the turnover
rate is higher among women than among men.
(2) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped
characteristics of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for
example, that men are less capable of assembling intricate
equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive salesman-
ship ....
(3) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of
coworkers, the employer, clients or customers .... 31
The EEOC is prepared to concede the existence of a BFOQ where
sex is necessary for authenticity or genuineness (e.g.
actor/actress). 32 It has been suggested that a BFOQ should be
recognized when required for "public decency" or sexual privacy
(e.g. washroom attendants). 33 And of course it goes without saying
that sex is a BFOQ where sexual characteristics are indispensable to
job performance (e.g. wet nurse, sperm donor). 34 But two leading
American cases both leave openings for a broader application of the
BFOQ exception than the EEOC suggests it should have, although
in neither case did the defence prevail on the facts.
In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company
3 5
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
• . . in order to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification
exemption the employer has the burden of proving that he had
reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing,
30. For a discussion of the legal status of these guidelines see Griggs v. Duke
Power (1971), 91 S.C. 849 at 854-5 (U.S.).
31. Revised EEOC Guidelines, Oehrnke, supra, note 29, at 102. Guideline
1604.2.
32. Id. at 102.
33. R. L. Epstein, Sex Discrimination in Hiring Practices of Private Employers:
Recent Legal Developments (1973-4). 48 Tulane L.R. 125 at 141.
34. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific (1971), 444 F.2d. 1219 (U.S.C.A. 9th
Circ.) at 1225.
35. Supra, note 26.
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that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.
36
This tests puts a heavy burden on the employer, one that few would
be able to meet. But it does leave open the loophole that, while it
prohibits an employer from basing his employment decisions on
assumptions about comparative employment characteristics, he
might be able to base them on concrete comparative data ("a factual
basis"). If he could show that "substantially all women" would be
unable to perform the work he would be under no obligation to
consider an individual woman who might be an exception to the
rule.
In Diaz v. Pan American World Airlines3 7 the same court,
although not rejecting Weeks, 3 8 formulated the test differently:
[D]iscrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of
the business operation would be undermined by not hiring
members of one sex exclusively.
3 9
Once again, this is a burdensome test. In the Diaz case40 itself, the
airline argued that the essence of its business was pleasing and
soothing air passengers, and that women alone were capable of
doing that. The court found that the essence of the business was
transporting passengers, and that hiring male cabin attendants
would not jeopardize that business. Under the Diaz test, the
employer must show not only that the qualities he is demanding for
the job are in fact sex-linked, but also that those qualities are
essential to job performance, not just tangential to it. Very few jobs
would fall into this category, but it might be open to an employer
who ran a night club, for example, to argue successfully that the
essence of his business was pleasing his customers and that
therefore customer preference was a legitimate consideration.
The Canadian position is very uncertain as yet, but there are
hopeful signs that Canadian adjudicators will construe the exception
at least as narrowly as the American courts have. In Shack v.
London Driv-Ur-Self4 ' a BFOQ defence was considered. The board
spoke of the American legislation as "the prototype for the Ontario
36. Id. at 235.
37. (1971), 442 F.2d. 385.
38. Supra, note 26.
39. Diaz, supra, note 37.
40. Id.
41. (Ontario Board of Inquiry, 1974).
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Act" 42 and viewed both the Weeks 43 and Diaz4 4 cases as valuable
aids to interpreting the Ontario Act (similar in the relevant
provisions to the Nova Scotia Act). The board found that stripping
down trucks was not a job that was "beyond the capabilities of all or
substantially all women" 45, and further, that the task was such a
small part of the job of a car rental clerk that even if it had been
beyond their capabilities it was not such an essential part of the
business as to sustain a BFOQ defence. 46
All Canadian jurisdictions have not been so ready to adopt the
American tests. A Saskatchewan board of inquiry also confronted
the issue in Lindsay v. Provincial Protection and Security
Agency. 47 There it was found that femaleness was a BFOQ for the
job of security guard at Saskatoon airport, where the duties included
doing body searches on female passengers. There was no discussion
of what form these searches took, or how significant a part of the
job they were. The problem is also alluded to in MacBean v. Village
of Plaster Rock, 48 a New Brunswick board of inquiry decision.
There was no BFOQ issue in the case, but the board suggested
obiter that the BFOQ exception might be broad enough to allow for
"consideration of stereotypical differences between the sexes rather
than only those differences which are universal." ,49
The BFOQ issue has not yet arisen before a board of inquiry in
Nova Scotia. It is, however, an issue that has come before the
Commission, since it has undertaken as part of its administrative
functions to "approve" BFOQ's on application by employers. 50
The Commission received a number of requests for approvals when
the legislation was first passed but most of these were not pursued.
At least one such request has been approved: guards for male
prisoners at the Halifax County Correctional Centre are required to
supervise showers for male prisoners, and this was found sufficient,
under the rubric of "public decency", to establish a BFOQ. 51
42. Id. at 18.
43. Supra, note 26.
44. Supra, note 37.
45. Shack, supra, note 41 at 21.
46. Id.
47. (Saskatchewan Board of Inquiry, 1975).
48. Supra, note 27.
49. Id. at 11.
50. See Human Rights: A Guide for Employers, a pamphlet published by the Nova
Scotia Human Rights Commission.
51. Conversation with K.Jega Nathan.
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This practice of "approving" BFOQ's seems a dubious one,
however little it is actually used. The Commission has no statutory
authority for interpreting the Act in this way. It could be argued that
if there is no authority for the practice it also does no harm, but this
is not necessarily so. If the Commission has approved a BFOQ it
has in effect prejudged the case, and is likely to dismiss a concrete
complaint regarding that job as insubstantial. Furthermore, if the
test for BFOQ's is a subjective one, what better evidence of "good
faith" could an employer offer than Commission approval of his
discriminatory practices? The officers of the Commission them-
selves are not wholly free of the vice of sexually stereotyped
thinking. In a newspaper interview at the time the sex
discrimination amendments were passed, the Director of the
Commission suggested "high rigger men placing steel" as an
example of a job that "by virtue of [its] nature" could only be done
by a man.52 The Human Rights Commission has, no doubt, come a
long way since 1972 in its understanding of the nature of a bonafide
qualification based on sex, but it is surely much better that these
things should be decided judicially before a board of inquiry where
the parties affected can all be heard.
It is submitted that no matter how narrowly the BFOQ exception
is construed, it is a dangerous and unnecessary loophole in the sex
discrimination provisions of the Act. It is dangerous because it is an
open invitation to employers, administrators and adjudicators alike
to bring their preconceptions and stereotypes about women along
with them to the interpretation of the Act. It is unnecessary because
to the extent that sex is a job-related qualification it is
comprehended in the general implied defence that the Act does not
require an employer to hire anyone who is not qualified for a job.
The complainant in BFOQ cases is never a man wanting a job as a
wet nurse, or a woman as a sperm donor. The defence is only
litigated in the border areas where the job applicant is confident of
his or her ability to do the job, and the employer seeks to refuse the
opportunity not on the basis of the applicant's personal qualifica-
tions but because of his or her sex. It is submitted that in those cases
it is no hardship, and accords with the fundamental goal of the Act
that people should be judged by individual rather than class
characteristics, that the employer should be asked to show that the
individual applicant cannot do the job.
52. The 4th Estate, June 8, 1972.
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2. Sex-Neutral Qualifications and Rules
It is a general principle that anti-discrimination legislation does
not force an employer to hire anyone who is not qualified for a job.
But it does not follow that an employer who applies objective,
sex-neutral job qualifications to all applicants should necessarily be
immune to a charge of sex discrimination. It is clear that some
sex-neutral job qualifications, such as the height/weight qualifica-
tions common to many police departments, may effectively exclude
most women from these jobs.
American courts have taken a very hard look at such
qualifications. The cases establish that if a complainant can show
(1) the existence of an employment policy based on "objective"
criteria like height and weight, and (2) that the policy has a disparate
effect on the employment opportunities of a class protected by
legislation from discrimination (e.g. women), then the burden shifts
to the employer to show (3) that the qualifications in question are in
fact reasonably related to the requirements of the job. 
53
An important case in the area of sex discrimination is Smith v.
City of East Cleveland, 54 in which a black woman successfully
challenged the height/weight requirements of the East Cleveland
Police Force. She was able to show a consistent policy that
applicants who did not meet the 5'8"/150 pound minimums were not
admitted for further testing for jobs with the Department. She
further put into evidence statistical data showing that these
requirements effectively excluded 95% of the female population
whereas they excluded only 46% of males. 55 The court found that
this disparate effect alone, without proof of discriminatory intent,
was sufficient to raise aprimafacie case which the employer would
have to meet by showing that the height/weight requirements were
"rationally related to job performace for an East Cleveland Police
Officer". 56 After examining the skills and functions of such a
police officer, the court concluded that the qualifications were not
job-related, and struck them down as sexually discriminatory.
As of yet, Canadian boards have shown little tendency to launch
this bold an attack on sex-neutral job qualifications. Similar issues
were raised in Nova Scotia in the Ryan case, 57 where the defence
53. The leading case is Griggs v. Duke Power, supra, note 30.
54. (1973), 363 F.Supp. 1131 (U.S.D.C.).
55. Id. at 1136.
56. Id. at 1138.
57. Supra, note 7.
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was that Ms. Ryan was not hired because she did not meet the
height/weight qualifications. The board of inquiry appeared to view
these qualifications as a complete defence. However, it is not clear
that the issue was properly placed before it. There was certainly no
evidence led that the regulations themselves were discriminatory,
and therefore noprimafacie case for the respondents to meet.
Under the American principle, if the employer cannot show that
the qualifications are job-related, they violate the Act even if there
was no discriminatory intent; if they are job-related they do not
violate the Act even if they have a disparate effect on a protected
class. This principle has been used to strike down (although not
always in the context of sex discrimination) employer policies of
using ability tests, union membership, established seniority
systems, and arrest records as criteria for employment decisions,
since all of these may have a disparate and usually non-job-related
effect on protected groups.
58
The principle has application not just to qualifications governing
access to jobs, but also to rules and regulations governing
"conditions of employment". For example, it could have a
potentially lethal effect on pension plans and insurance schemes that
distribute benefits by criteria that are not explicitly sex-related but
nevertheless have a disparate effect on women: pension plans that
provide survivors' benefits to families of "principal wage earners"
only, or disability insurance schemes that fail to provide for
maternity leave. 59
In the area of job rules or "conditions of employment" Canadian
boards have picked up the challenge. An interesting application of
the principle surfaced in the British Columbia case of Tharp v.
Lornex Mining, 60 which dealt with on-site accommodation provided
by the employer. This company had been the subject of an earlier
complaint to the Human Rights Commission that the company
refused to provide on-site accommodation to its female employees.
The company was ordered to provide accommodation, and
complied by simply lodging the one female employee rash enough
to apply in the bunkhouse with the men, where she had to share their
washroom facilities. She lodged a complaint with the Commission,
58. J.J. Suich, Height Standards in Police Employment and the Question of Sex
Discrimination (1974), 47 So. Cal. L.R. 585 at 594-5.
59.See Revised EEOC Guidelines, Oehmke, supra, note 29 at 105-6. Guideline
1604.9, 1604.10.
60. (British Columbia Board of Inquiry, 1975).
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and a board of inquiry found that the denial of sexual privacy to the
complainant as a result of the company's action made its
compliance with the earlier order a "mockery". The board rejected
the argument that "neutral" treatment is necessarily non-
discriminatory:
[I]t was contended that there can be no discrimination where
everyone receives equal treatment. We reject that contention. It is
a fundamentally important notion that identical treatment does
not necessarily mean equal treatment or the absence of
discrimination. 61
If a Canadian board can recognize this principle in the area of
"conditions of employment", it is but a short conceptual leap to an
application of it to "neutral" job qualifications. Equal opportunity
in employment demands equal access to employment as well as
equal treatment once employed, and access is not equal if
employment criteria are selected which consciously, unconsciously
or in the name of administrative convenience weed out the vast
majority of members of protected groups. Canadian boards must
make that conceptual leap, and it is submitted on the basis of the
Tharp case6 2 that they are ready to do so.
3. Conflicting Legislation
A special problem arises when the non-discrimination provisions
of the Human Rights Act conflict with other enactments either
requiring or authorizing employers to discriminate on the basis of
sex. It is perhaps somewhat misleading to suggest that conflicting
legislation furnishes a "standard" defence in Nova Scotia.
Legislation of this type is not extensive, and there are no special
limitations on hours of work, night work and weight-lifting for
women, such as have caused serious problems in other
jurisdictions.6 3 However, there is conflict, or potential conflict,




63. For a survey of protective legislation for women in Canada see The Law
Relating to Working Women (Labour Canada, Women's Bureau, 1975) at 22-6.
64. I believe these to be the only three pieces of explicitly discriminatory labour
legislation in Nova Scotia but I cannot claim to have done an exhaustive survey of
the statutes and regulations. See The Law Relating to Working Women, supra, note
63 at 24 and 26.
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(a). The Metalliferous Mines and Quarries Regulation Act 65
provides that:
4(2) No female person shall be employed at any mine except on
the surface in a technical, clerical or domestic capacity or such
other capacity as requires the exercise of normal feminine skill or
dexterity but does not involve strenuous physical effort.
(b). 1969 Regulations made pursuant to the Industrial Safety Act
66
provide that:
182. An employer shall,
(a) if females are employed, provide a rest room or space
affording reasonable privacy together with one or more couches
or cots and chairs and satisfactory to an inspector;
(b) if so directed in writing by the Chief Inspector, provide a
competent female employee to have charge of the welfare of
female employees, and such person may have other duties that do
not prevent her from adequately attending to such welfare.
(c). The Labour Standards Code67 empowers the Minimum Wage
Board to include in its orders wage differentials based on sex
(s.48(2) (a)). There are currently no such differential orders.
Legislation of the first two types is "protective":
Protective labour legislation, where it exists, is designed to
protect women from the physical hazards of employment. It is
based on two premises: first, that women are more vulnerable to
physical injury than are men; and second, that women are open to
exploitation. 
68
The Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in
Canada6 9 states quite succinctly the position of most thoughtful
critics of this kind of legislation:
We are opposed to discrimination in protective measures. If there
are hazards in employment, these measures should protect all
employees exposed to them. Protective legislation for women has
the effect of restricting their job opportunities.
70
Legislation of the third type appears to be based on no principle
more elevated than that the minimum wage should reflect existing
inequities in labour market bargaining power; it is clearly inimical
65. R.S.N.S. 1967, c.183.
66. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 141.
67. Supra, note 20.
68. Provincial Secretary for Social Development, Equal Opportunity for Women in
Ontario: A Plan for Action (1973) at 5.
69. (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970).
70. Id. at 89.
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to the equal pay provisions in the same statute, and may well give
way before them.
7 1
In a different constitutional context the American EEOC has
taken the position that state protective legislation requiring
employment practices which are unlawful under federal anti-
discrimination legislation is void, and the courts have by and large
accepted this position. 72 Not all protective legislation requires
unlawful employment practices; if a law requires an employer to
confer a benefit on female employees (as, for example, Reg. 182 of
the Nova Scotia Industrial Safety Regulations does), he can comply
with both the state law and the anti-discrimination laws by
conferring that benefit on employees of both sexes, and he may be
required to do so.
73
It is unlikely that Nova Scotia courts would accept the argument
that legislation requiring or authorizing discriminatory employment
practices is rendered void by the Human Rights Act. In the absence
of any constitutional issues, their only justification for doing so
would be to find that the Human Rights Act had repealed by
implication the earlier legislation. But
. . . repeal by implication is not favoured by the courts . . . and
if earlier and later statutes can reasonably be construed in such a
way that both can be given effect to, this must be done. 74
Generalis specialibus non derogant: a court would probably find
that the legislation requiring discrimination established a statutory
BFOQ.
Whether courts would pay the same deference to regulations as
they would to statutes is an open question. The Industrial Safety
Act7 5 does not authorize differential treatment based on sex, and, in
the light of the public policy enunciated in the Human Rights Act, a
court might well find Reg. 182 to be ultra vires. 76 Such a finding
71. In light of the equal pay provisions in s.55, s.48(2)(a) may have to be read as
authorizing a lower minimum wage for men, but not for women.
72. See T.H. Oehmke, Sex Discrimination in Employment (Detroit: Trends
Publishing, 1974) at 16-22.
73. Id. at 17.
74. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, supra, note 19.
75 .Supra, note 66.
76. See R. F. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice (Toronto: Butterworths,
1971) at 258-63. It should be noted that the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act
specifically voids regulations that discriminate on the basis of "race, religion,
creed, colour or ethnic or national origin", but makes no reference to sex (s. 13).
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might nudge the regulation-making authority into passing a similar
regulation which protected men and women equally.
It is interesting to note that the Human Rights Commission has
already had to deal with a complaint by a male employee that his
employer, by providing the kind of rest facilities contemplated by
Reg. 182 for his female employees only, was discriminating on the
basis of sex. The case was settled at the conciliation stage with the
employer agreeing to provide comparable facilities for both sexes.
77
Some jurisdictions have foreseen conflict between human rights
legislation and other legislation and specifically provided for it.
Ontario resolves the conflict in favour of the other legislation:
17A. Compliance with any provision for the protection or welfare
of females contained in The Industrial Safety Act, 1971, The
Employment Standards Act or The Mining Act shall not be
deemed to be a contravention of this Act. 78
Alberta takes the opposite tack:
1(1) Unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Legislature
that it operates notwithstanding this Act, every law of Alberta is
inoperative to the extent that it authorizes or requires the doing of
anything prohibited by this Act. 79
As far as I could discover, Alberta has not passed any employment
legislation to operate "notwithstanding"; it has in fact repealed
such discriminatory legislation as was on its books when its Act was
passed80
V. Proving Discrimination
Proving discrimination in employment is inherently more difficult
than proving assault or breach of contract. The employer makes his
employment decisions in a legal context in which an infinite number
of reasons for the decision are valid and only a very few are not; the
employee must show by relevant evidence that the reason for the
decision in question is one of those very few. In cases where
employees are not covered by collective agreements (and even in
some cases where they are) the employer has a virtually unassailable
77. Conversation with K.Jega Nathan.
78. The Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1970, c.318 as am. by S.O. 1972,
c.119, s.13.
79. The Individual's Rights Protection Act, S.A. 1972, c.2.
80. E.g. The Coal Mines Regulation Act, R.S.A. 1970, c.52 as am. by S.A. 1973,
c.61, s.2.
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right to be arbitrary in his employment policies, and though he can
be required to furnish such information and records as he has to the
Commission during an investigation (ss.24, 24A), there is no
obligation placed on him to keep the kind of records that would
assist a complainant in proving her case.
A further difficulty in meeting legal standards of proof in these
cases results from the multiple functions performed by the Human
Rights Commission. The only procedure provided by the Act for
collecting evidence is the investigation required by s.23 of the Act.
But the same officer who is investigating may be simultaneously
trying to effect a settlement. Sopinka, in an article entitled Proving
Discrimination in Boards of Inquiry under Ontario Human Rights
Code, 81 identifies the conflict here.
This dual function of the Commission's investigation creates a
dilemma. The fruits of the investigation, which from one point of
view should perhaps be privileged, are, from another point of
view, essential evidence where settlement is not achieved. 82
Evidence gathered by the investigating officer is often objected to
on grounds of privilege, and the complainant's case is consequently
weakened.
Section 26(3) of the Act requires that before a board of inquiry
makes recommendations to the Commission, it must find the
complaint "supported by a reasonable preponderance of the
evidence". This suggests the ordinary civil standard of proof, but
the position is not absolutely clear in Nova Scotia. A 1970 Nova
Scotia board of inquiry interpreted this to mean
a degree of evidence, the weight of which is greater than that
required to support a finding in a civil case, namely a mere
balance of evidence, but less than that required in a criminal
proceeding, namely beyond a reasonable doubt. 83
There is perhaps some support for this interpretation in the fact that
the Act requires this same standard of proof for prosecutions
(s.30(3)), but it is submitted that "reasonable preponderance of the
evidence" means no more and no less than "preponderance of the
evidence". To hold otherwise would be to suggest that the ordinary
civil standard of proof is unreasonable. Any higher standard puts a
burden on a complainant that is excessive for an Act which is, as an
81. 12 Human Relations #20 (Feb. 1972) 12.
82. Id. at 12.
83. Pate v. Wonnacott (Nova Scotia Board of Inquiry, 1970) at 3.
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Ontario board noted, "a public welfare statute rather than a criminal
enactment" designed "to regulate the social order, rather than to
single out wrongdoers." 
84
Proving discrimination, then, could be a well-nigh impossible
task in a hostile judicial environment. In general, Canadian boards
have not been hostile; on the contrary, they have been prepared to
interpret the statutes flexibly, adopting principles from other
jurisdictions and other areas of the law where necessary, so that the
remedial purposes of anti-discrimination legislation can be
achieved. This flexible interpretation has taken the form of (1)
giving a "broad and generous" interpretation to the operative
phrase "discrimination because of sex", and (2) making a realistic
assessment of what evidence is needed to raise aprimafacie case in
light of the nature of the employment relationship.
"Discrimination" as prohibited by the Act is an objective act; the
motive for that objective act is legally irrelevant. Furthermore, the
American cases have made clear that "the only form of 'intent'
required under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964 is that the
defendant meant to do what he did, that is, his employment practice
was not accidental." 85 This is. particularly important in attacking
practices like sex-neutral qualifications and rules: it would be
necessary then to show only that the policy which excluded women
existed, and not that the employer had adopted it in order to exclude
women or even realized that it had an exclusionary effect on
women. There has been no pronouncement yet from a Canadian
board of inquiry as to the form of "intent" required by the Act, but
it is submitted that the American definition is in accordance with
sound "objective" tort principles, is essential to the effective
working of the Act, and should be adopted when it becomes
necessary.
Canadian boards have consistently refused to interpret "discrimi-
nation because of sex" as meaning "discrimination by reason only
of sex". They have been prepared to find a violation of the Act
wherever sex is a factor in the employment decision:
A review of the purpose and provisions of the Human Rights
Code compels the conclusion that it is sufficient to constitute a
violation of the Code that a prohibited reason was one of the
reasons for the decision.
84. Quoted in R. Kerr, Legislation Against Discrimination in Canada (New
Brunswick Human Rights Commission, 1969) at 35.
85. Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach (1970), 319 F.Supp. 314 at 320.
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The purpose of the Code, as indicated by the Preamble and the
substantive provisions, is to eliminate from consideration in
decisions affecting employment . . . . those factors such as race
and sex which are listed in the Code. It is to make the governing
principle "that all persons are equal in dignity and human rights
without regard to . . . sex" (emphasis added). This purpose
would not be served if these factors can validly be considered
merely because they are considered in conjunction with other
legitimate factors. 86
A similar conclusion was arrived at in Segrave v. Zellers. 87 There
the board cites R. v. Bushnell Communications88, a case
interpreting s. 110(3) of the Canada Labour Code 88awhich
prohibits an employer from "refus[ing] . . . to continue to employ
any person . . . because the person is a member of a trade union."
In that case it was held to be sufficient
• . . that membership in a trade union was present in the mind of
the employer in his decision to dismiss, either as a main reason or
one incidental to it, or as one of many reasons regardless of
priority. 89
If this principle had been applied in the Ryan case 90 it would have
been sufficient to support a finding that the Chief of Police, at least,
had discriminated on the basis of sex. The board found that the
Chief had two reasons for his refusal to recommend Roberta Ryan;
one of these reasons was a discriminatory one, since it was based on
stereotyped assumptions about the ability of women to work the
night shift. Clearly then Ms. Ryan's sex was "present in the mind
of" the Chief when he made his recommendations and the fact that
he also had another reason for his refusal should have been no
defence.
The principle that sex need only be a factor in, and not the
principal basis for, an employment decision may have special
significance in jurisdictions like Nova Scotia where discrimination
on the ground of marital status is not expressly prohibited by the
Act. In any case where an employer has different rules for married
women than he has for married men, sex would be a factor in the
86. MacBean v. Village of Plaster Rock, supra, note 27 at 5.
87. Supra, note 23.
88. (1974), 1 O.R. (2d)442;45 D.L.R. (3d)218 (H.C.),affd(1974),40.R. (2d)
288; 47 D.L.R. (3d) 668 (C.A.).
88 a. R.S.C. 1970, c.L-1.
89. Supra, note 80 at 447; 45 D.L.R. at 223. Quoted in Segrave at 8.
90. Supra, note 7.
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differential treatment and there would be a violation of the general
prohibition against discrimination because of sex.
What kind of evidence, and how much, will be necessary to
prove discrimination? An American court made this observation:
It is obvious that in a case of sex discrimination, as in a case of
race discrimination, we very seldom find a resolution of a board
of directors or a faculty committee agreeing to engage in sex
discrimination . . . The existence of such discrimination must
therefore be found from circumstantial evidence and inference
from circumstances. 
91
American courts have devoted careful consideration to developing a
jurisprudence of circumstantial evidence in sex discrimination
cases. They are prepared to look at statistical data and probability
theory in evaluating employment patterns to see whether these
patterns have resulted from discriminatory practices, past or
present.
On a less sophisticated but equally clear-sighted level, at least
one Canadian board has been prepared to take a realistic approach to
the lack of direct evidence in these cases:
[T]he reasons for any decision on a matter within the ambit of the
Human Rights Code are particularly within the knowledge of the
deciding party. In such circumstances the decision itself, viewed
against such other facts as are available, may raise an inference of
unlawful discrimination such as calls for an explanation by the
deciding party. If an explanation is not forthcoming, one may
conclude that on the balance of probabilities there was unlawful
discrimination. 92
That board was prepared to infer from "a high level of
preoccupation with the factor of sex" 93 that a decision had been
made on a discriminatory basis.
Linked to the problem of lack of direct evidence in sex
discrimination cases is the question of what the complainant needs
to prove to raise a prima facie case. It may be very important to
identify the stage in a case at which the employer is called on for an
answer, given the fact that he is very likely the only person with
direct knowledge of the reasons for his decision.
The board in Segrave v. Zellers94 invoked the assistance of an
unfair labour practice case in defining "discrimination because of
91. Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh (1973), 359 F.Supp. 1002 at 1007-8.
92. MacBean v. Village of Plaster Rock, supra, note 27 at 7.
93. Id. at 9.
94. Supra, note 23.
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sex", and boards could usefully do the same in defining the
parameters of a prima facie case. Hughes C.J.N.B., in R. v. St.
Stephen Woodworking95, said
Indeed the occasions are rare when an employer admits he has
dismissed or is dismissing an employee because he is a member
of a trade union, but the law is not so weak that an employer may,
by giving no reason or a fictitious one, provide himself with a
defence. 96
He goes on the say: "the question for determination is whether the
evidence is sufficiently cogent to call for an explanation from the
defendant." 97 What is of particular relevance for our purposes is his
quotation from an earlier case, R. v. Jenkins:
In drawing an inference or conclusion from facts proved, regard
must always be had to the nature of the particular case and the
facility that appears to be afforded, either of explanation or
contradiction 98
Certainly in cases like these where the "nature of the particular
case" is that the reason for the decision is peculiarly within the
knowledge of the deciding party, there is a particularly strong
argument for making the burden of raising a prima facie case
relatively light. Once a complainant proves facts from which an
inference of sex discrimination can reasonably be drawn, it is
submitted that the burden should shift to the employer to furnish
another equally probable reason for his decision.
This may do injustice to those employers who make their
decisions, as they are legally entitled to do, for no reason at all. But
surely such employers are few and should not be coddled by the
law.
R. v. St. Stephen Woodworking99 was an appeal from a judgment
that had found "no evidence" that the employee in question had
been dismissed because of his trade union activities. Hughes
C.J.N.B. concludes that while there may have been no direct
evidence, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant a
conviction. 10 0 It is submitted that this approach could usefully have
95. (1972), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 602.




99. Supra, note 95.
100. Id. at 609-11.
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been taken in the Ryan case. 1 1 There too the board found "no
evidence" that the Council had discriminated against Roberta
Ryan. 102 But surely this is to ignore the inference that arises from
the fact that (1) the Chief of Police made recommendations to
Council for which he gave a discriminatory reason, whatever may
have been in the back of his mind, and (2) Council subsequently
made a decision consistent with those recommendations. In those
circumstances it could have been no injustice to the Council to have
required them to show that they made their decision without
reference to the Chief's recommendations, if that was in fact the
case.
No hard and fast rules can be laid down for identifying the
components of a prima facie case; these will differ in each fact
situation. But at a minimum it is submitted that the employer should
be called on for an answer when the reason given for the decision at
the time it was made turns out to be false, 10 3 when the person who
actually got the job is significantly less qualified than the
complainant and of the opposite sex, or when the composition of the
respondent's work force shows a clear pattern of sex discrimination
with which the employment decision in question is consistent.
A special problem of proof arises in cases where the employment
decision is made not by one person but collectively. Must the
complainant show that all the persons participating in the decision
discriminated, or that a majority of them did? The point is dealt with
in the MacBean case. 10 4 That case involved a complaint by a
woman that she had been refused a job as village Clerk-Treasurer
because of her sex. The hiring decision was made by vote of the
village Council. The board required the complainant to show that
the number of councillors for whom sex was a relevant factor was
sufficient to have changed the decision.' 0 5 Presumably this means
that in the case of a close vote it might be sufficient to show that one
out of a large number took sex into account if that one vote might
have changed the decision.
In large business organizations an applicant for a job or
promotion might go through several stages before a final decision is
101. Supra, note 7.
102. Id. at 18.
103. See J. Sopinka, Proving Discrimination in Boards of Inquiry Under Ontario
Human Rights Code, supra, note 81 at 12.
104. Supra, note 27.
105. Id. at6.
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reached. The initial contact with the company may be someone who
hands out application forms; he or she may have no authority
whatsoever to make decisions, but may nevertheless effectively
exclude an applicant from employment opportunities for reasons
prohibited by the Act. The question is whether the actions of such
employees come within the scope of the Act. This may depend on
whether the discriminating employees are carrying out company
policy or merely indulging their own prejudices. As a practical
matter the latter situation would be unlikely to come before a board
of inquiry; once the matter was brought to the employer's attention
he would rectify it. In the former situation there should be no
difficulty in finding the employer responsible by analogy to
vicarious liability principles. The Nova Scotia Act specifically
defines "person" as including an "employer . . . whether acting
directly or indirectly, alone or with another, or by the interposition
of another" (s.2(k)). In Segrave v. Zellers'0 6 the company was
found responsible for the actions of a personnel officer who "knew
[the company's] policies and was merely the corporate instrument
for exercising them."' 
0 7
A combination of the collective decision-making problem and the
hierarchical structure problem arose in the Ryan case:' 0 8 the
decision was made by a vote of Council on recommendations made
by the Chief of Police. The complex issues involved were barely
touched on in the decision but the board made a clear finding that
since the Chief "did not have authority as to 'providing or refusing
to provide . . . employment' within the meaning of [s. I IA (1) (d)]"
his recommendation, even if it was discriminatory, did not fall
within the purview of the Act "without any action having been
taken pursuant to [it]". ' 0 9 It is difficult to take exception to this as
stated: recommendations that are ignored would have no adverse
effect on the complainant. But for reasons I have already discussed I
suggest that the board assumes much too readily that the Chief's
recommendations were not acted upon.
VI. Complaints Mechanism
1. Steps in Processing a Complaint
106. Supra, note 23.
107. Id. at 11.
108. Supra, note 7.
109. Id. at 18.
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The Human Rights Act is administered by the Nova Scotia
Human Rights Commission (s.17), a body appointed by the
Governor in Council (s. 16(2)). The actual work of investigation and
conciliation is done by a staff of investigative officers working
under the Director, himself a full-time civil servant and a member of
the Commission (ss.20-1).
The principal method contemplated by the Act for dealing with
violations of its provisions is the complaints mechanism adminis-
tered by the Commission.
23. The Commission shall instruct the Director or some other
officer to inquire into and endeavour to effect a settlement of an
alleged violation of this Act where,
(a) the person aggrieved makes a complaint in writing on a
form prescribed by the Director; or
(b) the Commission has reasonable grounds for believing that
a complaint exists.
The process can be activated, then, by either an individual
complainant or by the Commission. In practice the authority under
23(b) is used in only about 10% of cases. 110 The Commission does
very little spot-checking or investigating on its own initiative. In
cases where an informal complaint has been made but the
complainant does not wish to be identified for fear of reprisals an
investigation can be made under s.23(b). Third party complaints
could be dealt with in this way as well, although the Nova Scotia
Act makes no specific provision for them. I"
One relatively untested possibility is that class complaints can be
initated under s.23. Section 1 A specifically prohibits discrimina-
tion "because of the sex of the individual or class of individuals"
(emphasis added); therefore discrimination against a class is a clear
violation of the Act. Many instances of institutionalized discrimina-
tion could not be effectively tackled on an individual or even on a
group basis; a class complaint might result in more sweeping and
comprehensive remedies. The possibility has been recently explored
by the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission, although not in the
area of sex discrimination or employment. A class complaint was
brought by the residents of the North and East Preston school
districts against the Halifax County School Board alleging
110. Conversation with K.Jega Nathan.
111. Some jurisdictions do: e.g. The Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1970,
c.318, s.13 as am. by S.0. 1971, c.50, s.63.
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discrimination in provision of educational facilities and services
because of race and colour. The case was settled before it reached
the inquiry stage, so the validity of the class complaint was not
challenged. 112
Once the initial step has been taken, the Act imposes on the
Commission a duty to see to it that an investigative officer makes an
inquiry and "endeavour[s] to effect a settlement" (s.23). Section 24
gives the investigative officer power to examine records, require
information and inspect premises. This power may be backed up by
court order if necessary (s.24A).
The practice of the Nova Scotia Commission is that if the
investigative officer turns up "no probable cause" that a violation
of the Act has taken place, the complaint is summarily
dismissed. 113 It is questionable whether on a strict interpretation of
the Statute it is authorized to dismiss a complaint without attempting
conciliation. 114 Section 25(1) provides the only statutory follow-up
procedure to s.23: "If the Director or other officer is unable to
effect a settlement of the matter complained of, the Commission
shall make a report to the Minister". 115
If "probable cause" is found, the matter then enters a formal
conciliation stage, in which the investigative officer attempts to
effect settlement. The percentage of cases settled at this stage is
remarkably high as compared to the number in which a public
inquiry is found necessary. 116 There are powerful pressures on an
employer who has in fact discriminated to settle at this point; he
may or may not get easier terms, but the most important factor is
that he avoids public exposure. There is nothing in the Act that
prevents the Commission from publicizing names of respondents
112. See Newsletter, Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission, 4th quarter, 1975
at 2-3. It is interesting to note in this regard that s.8 does not include the phrase
"class of individuals" although s.3, the section relevant to the Preston complaint,
does.
113. See Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission, Summary of Activities '74,
"Steps in Processing Complaints" (no page numbers).
114. Some jurisdictions give their Commissions express authority to dismiss an
unmeritorious complaint at any stage of the proceedings: e.g. The Individual's
Rights Protection Act, S.A. 1972, c.2, s. 17(4). The legislative provisions of the
various jurisdictions are compared in Canada Department of Labour, 1975 Human
Rights in Canada: Legislation and Decisions (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974
[sic]) at 30-31.
115. At present the Minister responsible for the Human Rights Act is the
Attorney-General.
116. 1974 figures for all formal complaints: resolved-60; no probable cause-43;
Sex Discrimination in Employment: 621
who have settled and terms of settlement, but as a matter of policy
in expediting settlements, this information is treated as
confidential. 
117
Typical terms of settlement are similar to typical remedial
recommendations from boards of inquiry, and might include: (1) an
offer of a job, a promise of the next suitable job that becomes
available, or monetary compensation if no job is likely to be
available or the complainant is no longer interested in it; (2) an
undertaking to the Commission not to discriminate in the future; and
(3) an undertaking to post the Human Rights Scroll at the place of
business and to advertise in future as an "equal opportunity
employer". 118
As of yet, sums in the nature of general damages for suffering and
humiliation are not included in Nova Scotia settlements. Commis-
sion officials take the position that these are inappropriate since
such awards might antagonize employers and impede the process of
settlement. The question of such general damages was considered
by a Nova Scotia board in Pate v. Wonnacott:119
As to monetary compensation for injured feelings and emotional
injury . . . I agree with Dean Tarnopolsky that compensation for
injury such as this was not contemplated by the Ontario
legislature when it passed the Ontario Code, or by our own
legislature when it passed the Human Rights Act. The main
purposes of the Act are education and the promotion of equality
of opportunity for jobs, housing and so on, and not to give a
complainant the additional opportunity of compensation in
money terms - except possibly where the damages are special,
that is, where specific sums can be shown to have been lost by
reason of the discriminatory act. 12
0
The Ontario legislation has since been amended to give boards more
flexibility in ordering remedies, and Ontario boards now take the
investigation continuing-9; public inquiry recommended-3; withdrawn-5;
total-120. From Summary of Activities '74, supra, note 113.
117. Conversation with K.Jega Nathan. This policy appears to be carried out only
up to the point where a board of inquiry is appointed. After the appointment is
made the terms of any settlement arrived at prior to the hearing must be reported to
the Commission by the board (s.26(2)), and "the Commission [will] consider
giving up its right to publish the Board of Inquiry's report only in very unusual
circumstances." (Braithwaite v. Halifax Developments, Nova Scotia Board of
Inquiry, 1975 at 3).
118. Conversation with K.Jega Nathan.
119. (Nova Scotia Board of Inquiry, 1970).
120. Id. at 22.
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position that general damages are available.' 2l This course is
certainly open to Nova Scotia boards as well.
The Commission will, of course, settle for terms less
comprehensive than these when necessary. In Perry v. Robert
Simpson Eastern122 it was prepared to waive the complaint if
Simpson's would agree to the implementation of an affirmative
action programme.1 23 There would have been no personal remedy
for the complainant. It seems fair to conclude that the high
percentage of settlements reflected in Commission statistics do not
necessarily reflect the number of cases in which there has been
substantial redress for the individual complainant.
If the investigative officer is unable to effect a settlement, he or
she reports to the Commission, who in turn submits a report to the
Minister (s.25(1)). In practice the Commission may send the
complaint back to the officer to try again for a settlement, and
requires a strong case before it will recommend to the Minister that
a board of inquiry be appointed. Presumably the offered terms of
settlement become increasingly less favourable to the complainant
each time the case is sent back, and if the employer continues to be
recalcitrant the case may have to be withdrawn for lack of evidence.
This reluctance to recommend boards in "doubtful" cases arises in
part out of solicitude for employers who will be put to legal
expenses which the Act makes no provision for them to recover.
Surely this is a questionable factor to consider in administering a
remedial statute. A more legitimate concern may be a calculation
that the high rate of settlements could not be maintained if the
Commission established a losing record at boards of inquiry.
Once this report has been made, the Minister in his discretion
'may appoint one or more persons to be a board of inquiry to
investigate and seek settlement of the complaint" (s.25(l)). The
board's statutory duty is similar, then, to the duty of an investigative
officer under s.23, but at this point the inquiry becomes public. The
board, when appointed, exercises a quasi-judicial function: 124
26(1) Upon its appointment a board of inquiry shall conduct a
public inquiry into the matter referred to it and shall give full
121. See Shack v. London Driv-Ur-Self (Ontario Board of Inquiry, 1974) at 23-4.
122. Nova Scotia Board of Inquiry held in January and February, 1976; no
decision has been handed down at time of writing.
123. The Chronicle-Herald, February 12, 1976.
124. See Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, [1971] S.C.R. 756; 18
D.L.R. (3d) 1, rev'g on other grounds (sub nom. R. v. Tarnopolsky, Exparte Bell)
[197012 O.R. 672; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 658.
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opportunity to all parties to present evidence and make
representations.
If, after conducting the hearing, the board is unable to effect a
settlement and finds the complaint "supported by a reasonable
preponderance of the evidence" (s.26(3)), it must make recommen-
dations to the Commission on remedial action. The Commission
must in turn make a report to the Minister recommending "any
action necessary to give effect to the recommendations of the
Board" (s.27(3)). But once again the Minister has a discretion as to
whether or not he will take action on the recommendations
(s.28(1)). If the Minister does make an order under s.28 against the
respondent and the respondent does not comply with it, he can, with
the consent of the Minister, be prosecuted for failure to
comply (s.29). If the prosecution is successful the Minister may
apply for an injunction against "continuing the offence" (s.32(1)).
2. Status of the Complainant
The complaints mechanism outlined above is the principal
mechanism provided by the Act for vindicating the rights it confers.
In light of this it is very important to examine the position of the
individual complainant in the administrative process to see how well
her rights are protected.
The employer-respondent is often represented by legal counsel
throughout the process, and invariably has his own lawyer at boards
of inquiry.1 25 The Commission takes the position that while the
complainant is likewise entitled to independent legal representation,
this is usually unnecessary since her interests are represented by the
Commission. The practice of having the Commission lawyer
represent both Commission and complainant was severely criticized
by a Nova Scotia board inBraithwaite v. Halifax Developments:12 6
It seems to me that, under the procedure contemplated by the
Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, there is always the possibility of
conflicts of interest arising when the same solicitor or counsel
represents both a Complainant and the Commission. I think that it
is obvious that many of the problems encountered in this case
would not have arisen if the Complainant and the Commission
had been separately represented after the board of inquiry was
appointed. 127
125. Conversation with K.Jega Nathan.
126. (Nova Scotia Board of Inquiry, 1975).
127. Id. at4.
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In practice complainants are unlikely to be able or willing to incur
the expense of separate legal representation, although at least one
complainant in a sex discrimination case retained her own counsel at
the public inquiry stage. '
2 8
A "person aggrieved" clearly has the right to file a written
complaint under s.23(a), and, if my reading of s.23 and s.25(1) as
outlined above is correct she ought also to have the right to insist
that the complaint be duly processed through conciliation up to the
point where the Commission reports to the Minister. But it is not
easy to see how, in the face of a Commission decision to dismiss the
complaint, this latter right could be enforced or what benefit it
would be to the complainant to enforce it. Presumably the usual
remedy for enforcing statutory duties would be available: an order
of mandamus. But the duty stops with the report to the Minister, and
a court could not compel the Commission to recommend a board of
inquiry in its report. There is, of course, no duty on the Minister to
appoint such a board no matter what recommendations the
Commission makes to him. Therefore the only force of an order of
mandamus would be to compel a reluctant Commission to attempt
to effect a settlement and to report to the Minister.
The status of the complainant in the formal conciliation stage is
extremely ambiguous. The board of inquiry in Braithwaite v.
Halifax Developments129 found that the "parties" to the complaint
referred to in s.25(3) and s.26(l) and (2) were the complainant and
the respondent: the Commission itself was not such a party. If this
interpretation is correct, 130 the complaint could not be settled by
agreement between the Commission and the respondent without the
consent of the complainant after the appointment of the board.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the finding of an Ontario
board of inquiry in Amber v. Leder. 131 In that case the respondent
had refused to accept terms of settlement proposed by the
Commission until after the appointment of a board; it was at that
point that the Commission discovered that the terms it was
128. Grandy v. Atmus Equipment, Nova Scotia Board of Inquiry held in
November, 1975; no decision has been handed down at time of writing.
129. Supra, note 126.
130. In those jurisdictions that spell out who the parties to the action are, the
Commission is always included: e.g. The Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O.
1970, c.318, s. 14b(1) as am. by S.O. 1971, c.50, s.63.
131. (Ontario Board of Inquiry, 1970). Some of the information on this case is
taken from I.A. Hunter, The Development of the Ontario Human Rights Code
(1972), 22 U. of Toronto L. J. 237 at 245-8.
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proposing were unacceptable to the complainant, who insisted that
the inquiry proceed. Dean Walter Tarnopolsky, the one man board
in the case, decided that
[o]nce appointed. . . the Board of Inquiry had a mandatory duty
to allow the parties to present evidence unless a settlement
satisfactory to all parties had previously been reached. 132
He found this mandatory duty in statutory language similar to
s.26(l) of the Nova Scotia Act which requires that
[u]pon its appointment a board of inquiry shall conduct a public
inquiry into the matter referred to it and shall give full
opportunity to all parties to present evidence and make
representations (emphasis added).
It should be noted that subsequent to this case the Ontario Code was
amended removing the language Tamopolsky found to establish a
mandatory duty to hear the complaint, and specifically providing
that "the Commission . . . shall have the carriage of the
complaint" before a board. 133 This would appear to give the
Ontario Commission complete authority to settle or withdraw a
complaint even after a board had been appointed. The Nova Scotia
legislation, however, remains similar to that considered in Amber v.
Leder. 134
The complainant can, then, probably block an unsatisfactory
settlement after the appointment of the board, but it is not so clear
that she can do so before. The statutory language speaks of
"settlement of the complaint" (s.23, 25(1)) rather than settlement
"between the parties" (s.26(2),(3)). The very concept of settlement
suggests a negotiated arrangement between the person wronged and
the person wronging, mediated by the Commission. But this is not
an inevitable conclusion, since the Commission itself has a very
legitimate interest in effecting settlements and some of the typical
terms of a negotiated settlement discussed above further the
long-range goals of the Commission rather than benefiting directly
the complainant. The board in Amber v. Leder however, found that
"[r]egardless of how reasonable the terms of settlement may appear
to the Commission . . .a settlement cannot be effected unless both
132. Id. at 247.
133. The Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318 as am. by S.O. 1971,
c.50, s.63.
134. Supra, note 131.
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parties agree to it", whether before or after the board's
appointment. 135
But even if "settlement" prior to the board's appointment must
be read as "settlement between the parties" and a complainant
could successfully block an unsatisfactory settlement, it would be a
somewhat hollow victory. In such a case the Commission would
surely view the actions of the complainant as unreasonable and it is
extremely unlikely that it would recommend the appointment of a
board of inquiry.
Even in a case where the complainant has the willing cooperation
of the Commission she is still faced with the twin hurdles of
ministerial discretion in the appointment of a board of inquiry
(s.25(l)) and in implementing the recommendations of such a board
(s.28(l)). By building such discretion into the Act the legislature
has manifested its conviction that control over the enforcement of
human rights should be retained in the political arm of the
government. Such a policy is clearly undesirable and open to abuse.
In practice it appears that this ministerial discretion is consistently
exercised on the recommendations of the Commission,1 36 but this
may mean no more than that the Commission itself has never
strayed beyond the realm of what is politically acceptable in Nova
Scotia.
Of course this discretion does leave an avenue open to a
complainant where the Commission has been unable to effect a
settlement but for some reason has not recommended the
appointment of a board of inquiry under s.25(l). At least in theory
such a complainant could appeal directly to the Minister, exerting
whatever political pressure she could muster, for the appointment of
a board.
This administrative mechanism, which is heavily settlement-
oriented and gives the Commission or its equivalent virtually
complete control over the extent to which a complaint will be
processed, is common to all Canadian jurisdictions. It reflects a
legislative commitment to the principle that these matters are better
dealt with out of the light of public scrutiny unless the Commission
or the Minister decides that it is in the public interest for them to be
heard. It also reflects a parternalistic distrust of the good judgment,
and perhaps the good faith, of the typical complainant. This has, of
135. (Ontario Board of Inquiry, 1970) at 13.
136. Conversation with K.Jega Nathan.
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course, historically been the attitude of governments, and society at
large, to minority groups and women, but it is ironic that it should
be perpetuated in a statute ostensibly designed to help eradicate just
those attitudes.
This tight administrative hold on access to remedies is to be
contrasted with the situation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
1964,137 the comparable American legislation. That Act establishes
an administrative agency, the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission, to deal with complaints, and contemplates that people
should first attempt to have their complaints redressed through
administrative means before seeking access to the courts. The
EEOC investigates the complaint; if it finds "probable cause" it
attempts to conciliate. But if it fails in conciliation, or even in cases
where it does not conciliate because it does not find "probable
cause", the complainant can bring a civil action in federal court. 1
38
Furthermore, as a response to delays caused by the huge back-log of
complaints with which it has to deal, the EEOC was given the
power to grant "suit letters" to complainants authorizing them to
bring civil action despite the fact that the EEOC had not investigated
and conciliated. In all cases, then, the complainant can exercise her
own judgement as to whether to expend the time, effort and expense
in pursuing her complaint. 1
39
VII. Alternative Remedies
A person who feels that she has been discriminated against contrary
to the Human Rights Act, but either does not wish to go through or
cannot gain effective access to the complaints mechanism, is not
entirely without recourse. One alternative remedy expressly
provided for in the Act is prosecution:
29. Every person who does anything prohibited by this Act...
is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction,
(a) if an individual, to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars;
and
(b) if a person other than an individual, to a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars.
137. 78 Stat. 241.
138. In some cases the action will be brought by the EEOC or the
Attorney-General.
139. Information on Title VII and the EEOC was taken from S. Roberts,
Employment Litigation: A Feminist Viewpoint (1973), 9 Trial 13, and L.S.
Bohnen, Women Workers in Ontario: A Socio-Legal History (1973), 31 U. of T.
Fac. L.R. 45.
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This course of action has at least two serious disadvantages. First of
all, the remedies are limited and provide no possibility of individual
redress to a person aggrieved by isolated acts of discrimination,
although in cases of continuing discrimination an injunction, for
which only the Minister can apply (s.32), might be available.
Secondly, it is necessary to get ministerial permission to prosecute
(s.30(l)). This is unlikely to be forthcoming at the request of an
individual. Except in unusual circumstances the Minister is likely to
find public policy best served by requiring people to pursue their
administrative remedies, and if they have failed to make a case in
the complaints procedure, permission to prosecute would smack of
double jeopardy. Commission officials feel that the prosecution
provision is in the Act to deal with continuing offenders with whom
conciliation would be fruitless and who should be prosecuted at the
request of the Commission; it is not to allow individuals to
circumvent the administrative procedures provided by the Act. 
140
Another possible alternative to the complaints mechanism is to
bring a civil action directly in the Supreme Court based on breach of
statutory duty.
When a statute creates a new obligation or makes unlawful that
which was lawful before, a corresponding right may thereby be
impliedly given, either to the public or to individuals injured by
the breach of the enactment. 1
41
This tack has already been tried in Nova Scotia in Beattie v. Acadia
University. 142 In that case a group of American basketball players,
students at Acadia University, filed a complaint with the Human
Rights Commission alleging that Acadia, by complying with CIAU
regulations limiting the number of non-Canadian players on any
team, was discriminating against them in provision of services and
facilities on the basis of national origin. The case went to a board of
inquiry, where there was a finding of discrimination, but doubt
expressed as to whether membership on a university basketball team
was a facility or service within the Act. Because of this doubtful
finding, no action was taken against Acadia.
The players then brought an action in Supreme Court for an
injunction. The decision to deny the injunction was based squarely
on the finding that "the opportunity to play on a varsity basketball
140. Conversation with K.Jega Nathan.
141. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, supra, note 19 at 334.
142. Unreported decision of Hart J., Nova Scotia Supreme Court.
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team" does not fall within s.3 of the Act.' 4 3 There was no
suggestion whatsoever that the judge would have denied the
injunction if he had found discrimination within the Act.
In principle this seems an unlikely statute in which to find'a civil
right actionable in the ordinary courts.
Where a new obligation not previously existing is created by a
statute which at the same time gives a special remedy for
enforcing it, the initial general rule is that the obligation cannot
be enforced in any other manner . . . . the statute may be
intended to be a code complete in itself. 1
44
The Human Rights Act provides not one but two "special"
remedies: the complaints mechanism and prosecution. Furthermore,
when the legislature was so careful to put control over access to
these remedies in the hands of administrative officials and
politicians, it would take a rash court indeed to find a legislative
intent to allow an aggrieved person direct access to the courts. But
the question is . . .one of the true construction of the particular
statute concerned, and it may be the intention of the statute, as
disclosed by its scope and by its wording, that other remedies
should not be excluded .... 145
A court might be persuaded that since these special remedies are not
enforceable directly by the aggrived person herself, the legislature
did not intend to deny her personal remedies in the courts.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper deals with the Human Rights Act from two perspectives,
the substantive and the procedural. There is a certain air of unreality
about examining these aspects together, for it is abundantly clear on
examining both the Human Rights Commission statistics 146 and the
nature of the complaints mechanism, that the substantive provisions
are so rarely tested as to be virtually irrelevant. 1
47
Why is human rights legislation designed to protect itself from
judicial interpretation and public enforcement? All Canadian human
rights legislation
143. Id. at4.
144. 36Halsbury's Laws of England (3d ed.) at 442, para. 668.
145. Id.
146. Supra, note 116.
147. So irrelevant are they, in fact, that the Commission invites and feels quite
competent to deal with complaints over which it has no jurisdiction: see How to
File a Complaint of Discrimination, a pamphlet published by the Nova Scotia
Human Rights Commission.
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. . . is predicated on the theory that the actions of prejudiced
people and their attitudes can be changed and influenced by the
process of re-education, discussion and the presentation of
socio-scientific materials that are used to challenge the popular
myths and stereotypes about people. 
148
Discrimination is seen as caused by subjective factors, by attitudes:
attitudes are changed by education. Hence the focus on conciliation
and settlement rather than enforcement. Enforcement, in fact is seen
as something to be avoided since it may harden attitudes.
This theory has questionable validity in the employment context.
Employers give numbers of reasons for their reluctance to give
women equal opportunity in the work force: women need
protection; women should stay at home; women are incompetent;
women are taking jobs away from men who need them to support
families. All these reasons reflect stereotyped "attitudes". But
what lies behind those attitudes?
Businessmen, in a society geared to profit maximization, rarely
allow subjective factors to interfere with their long-range goals.
And whatever the causes of sex discrimination, it is clear that as an
institution it is highly compatible with profit maximization.
Unequal pay for equal work means higher profits if productivity is
constant. Pension and insurance plans which return less in benefits
to women lower the employer's unit costs. 149 Maintenance of
female job ghettoes allows employers to pay less for labour time
without reference to productivity and thus increases rates of profit.
Is it really conceivable that employers will be persuaded to
abandon this rich vein of profitable exploitation because they are
told that discrimination against women is "unfair"? The process of
conciliation may work well enough when the economic stakes are
low: when the issue revolves around putting chairs in the men's
washroom or hiring a woman truck driver, it is easier to switch than
fight. But what happens when the stakes are higher? How amenable
to conciliation will the employer be who is faced with a bill for a
million dollars in back pay?
For stubborn cases there is, of course, the public inquiry and
prosecution. But the structure is carefully designed to weed out
difficult cases, politically sensitive cases, cases that might make
148. Quoted from Daniel G. Hill in I.A. Hunter, The Development of the Ontario
Human Rights Code (1972), 22 U. of Toronto L.J. 237 at 245.
149. See J. Fichaud, Pensions: A Primer for Lawyers (1975), 2 Dalhousie L.J.
369 at 381-2.
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Nova Scotia an inhospitable environment for industry, long before
they get to that stage. Conciliation keeps the law untested, and an
untested law enforced at the discretion of a Minister is unlikely to
have much effect on the really substantial and deep-rooted patterns
of sex discrimination in this province, especially when those
patterns are so profitable.
Women themselves certainly do not see their salvation in the
Human Rights Commission. There were forty-two sex discrimina-
tion complaints lodged in 1973, and a mere twenty-four in 1974;150
this in a period when government statistics show wage differentials
and occupational segregation to be staggeringly pervasive and, in
general, on the increase.' 5 ' The reasons why women do not
complain about their situation are many and complex, but the fact is
that the vast majority of them do not.152 An individual complaints
mechanism can necessarily only scratch the surface of the problem.
Alternatives to the complaints mechanism have been proposed.
Some of these have already been implemented in the United States
where sex discrimination legislation has a longer history. One such
alternative is affirmative action. American affirmative action
programmes are designed so that any business wishing to obtain
federal government contracts must undertake not to discriminate
and to take affirmative action to eliminate the effects of past
discrimination, 153 by preferential hiring and quota systems if
necessary. The Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission is
authorized by s.19 of the Act to negotiate affirmative action
programmes and has in fact done so.' 5 4 But the Nova Scotia
programmes are strictly voluntary; the Act provides no incentives
for employers to enter into them, and no procedures whereby the
Commission can enforce compliance by those employers who do
enter into them.
A second alternative would be simply to supplement the
individual complaints mechanism with a vigorous programme of
investigation and initiation of class complaints by the Commission
itself. The Nova Scotia Commission presently has the statutory
150. See Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission, Summary of Activities, '73 and
'74.
151. See Labour Canada, Women's Bureau, Women in the Labour Force: Facts
and Figures (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), especially 70-1.
152. See Bohnen, supra, note 139, and "Equal Pay Programmes in Canada and
the United States of America", Women's Bureau '74, supra, note 5.
153. Bohnen, supra, note 139 at 71-2.
154. Conversation with K.Jega Nathan.
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authority to initiate complaints, but uses it rarely, both out of a
shortage of resources and an ideological commitment to the
individual complaints mechanism.
Either of these changes would help to bring within the ambit of
the legislation the more pervasive and subtle forms of in-
stitutionalized discrimination that cannot be attacked through the
complaints mechanism. They would also short-circuit the individual
reluctance to complain. Such changes, along with the elimination of
ministerial discretion in enforcement, would go a long way towards
strengthening the Act. But if we accept the premise that sex
discrimination maximizes profits, any of these changes, to be
effective, would have to be accompanied by penalties stiff enough
to make discrimination unprofitable. Currently it is much cheaper
for an employer to wait for the law to find him out, than it is for him
to make the necessary adjustments himself. That situation would
have to be reversed before employers could be counted on to bring
themselves "voluntarily" into compliance with the law. It is only
by attacking sex discrimination at its economic roots that the law
can be made, as it needs to be, self-enforcing.
